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Guaranty of and Security for the
Debt of a Parent Corporation
by a Subsidiary Corporation
William H. Coquillette*
The upstream guaranty, where a subsidiaryguaranteesa loan to its parentby a
thirdparty andperhapssupports it by a grant of security interests, is a sometimes
desirablefnancialdevice which may involvepitfallsforunwary counsel. The author
examines thesepitfalls, includingpossible lack of corporate authority,possible construction as dividends, distributions, or loans to shareholders, and potential
avoidabilityasfraudulentconveyances. He concludesthat, with specfiedprecautions
taken, counsel can confidently advise his or her clients that such transactionsare
valid,binding, andenforceable. He notes, however, thatparticularly where the subsidiary financialcondition is weak, counsel must be preparedto advise the client
that an upstream guarantyand relatedgrant of securit interests will be ineffective.
INTRODUCTION

LIMITATION OF

liability is one of the well-recognized advantages

of using the corporate form to conduct business. In the standard situation where a corporation ("Parent") uses a wholly

owned corporation ("Subsidiary") to conduct all or a part of Parent's business, Parent's liabilities with respect to the business
owned and operated by Subsidiary are limited in the sense that
Subsidiary's creditors have no legal right under normal circumstances to look to Parent's assets for satisfaction of their claims.'
The law recognizes separate identities for Parent and Subsidiary,

each responsible only for its own debts even though both are part
of a single business enterprise and form an economic unit with a
single group of beneficial owners.

This recognition of separate legal identities also means that
Subsidiary's liability is limited with respect to Parent. Subsidiary
*

B.A. (1971), Yale University; B.A. (1973), University College, Oxford; J.D. (1975),

Harvard University. The author is associated with the firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue,
in its Cleveland office. The firm which employs the author has represented clients in transactions involving upstream guaranties and has given opinions that such guaranties are
valid. To this extent, the author has an interest in the law as applied to such transactions.
1. Subsidiary's creditors may look to Parent's assets if Subsidiary is thinly capitalized
or other facts cause a court to "pierce the corporate veil." Some of Subsidiary's statutory
liabilities may attach to Parent's assets. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974,29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1976); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 63 (McKinney 1963).
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is not liable for Parent's debts, and Parent's creditors cannot look
to Subsidiary's assets for satisfaction of their claims until each and
every creditor of Subsidiary has been provided for in full and

Subsidiary is liquidated or its surplus property distributed to Parent.' Because a financially distressed Parent is likely to have
drawn off Subsidiary's surplus property to the extent permitted by
law, Parent's creditors should not rely on finding substantial value
in their last priority rights to Subsidiary's property.
Limited liability worries the creditors of a corporation and
their legal counsel. Unless Parent and Subsidiary are each out-

standingly creditworthy, a future creditor of either corporation in
a deal of any size may seek ways to circumvent these limitations
of liability by means of an intercorporate guaranty.' Although a
trade creditor may insist on guaranties, the intercorporate guar-

anty is typically encountered in financings by banks or other lenders. In the case of a loan to Subsidiary, the lender may require
that Parent guarantee repayment by Subsidiary. This type of
financing arrangement is commonly referred to as a "downstream
guaranty." In the case of a loan to Parent, the lender may require
an "upstream guaranty," where Subsidiary guarantees the repayment by Parent. 4 To further secure its loan, the lender may require that Subsidiary grant it a mortgage on all or part of its real

property and a security interest in all or part of its personal property (hereinafter collectively referred to as "security interests").
To have any commercial value, the guaranty and the grant of se2. State laws generally require that dividends or distributions to shareholders only be
made to the extent of earned or capital surplus and often impose restrictions to assure that
such dividends or distributions will not jeopardize the solvency of the corporation. See,
e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT, §§ 45, 46 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MBCA];
CAL. CORP. Comin §§ 500-03. 506 (WEST 1977): Dt.L. Cotin ANN. tit. 8. §§ 170-74 (1975):
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law. §§ 510-I1 (McKinney 1963): Oio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.33-.95

(Page 1978). In the event of the Subsidiary's dissolution or liquidation, state laws generally
require that adequate provision be made for creditors before the shareholders receive any
of the corporation's property or assets. See, e.g., MBCA §§ 87, 98; CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 2004 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 279, 281 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 1005-09 (McKinney 1963); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.88-.89 (Page 1978); Butler v.
New Keystone Copper Co., 10 Del. Ch. 371, 93 A. 380 (1915).
3. Another possible means of providing security to a lender or other creditor is an
investment contract or other supporting contract. See Dwyer, A Legal andBusinessExamination of the ContractuallySupported Investment in Relation to the CorporateG6iaranfy 23
SYRACUSE L. REv. 33 (1972); Everdell & Longstreth, Some Special Problemr Raised by
Debt Financingof CoraporationsUnder Common Control, 17 Bus. LAW. 500 (1962).
4. A guaranty by Subsidiary of the repayment by another subsidiary of Parent (a
"cross-stream guaranty") is similar to an upstream guaranty in that in the usual case the
benefit of such a guaranty runs most directly to Parent. In most cases, the analysis of the
validity of an upstream guaranty is applicable to a cross-stream guaranty.
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curity interests must be valid, binding, and enforceable so that the
5
lender is justified in relying on them in making the loan.
Whether the making of such upstream guaranties or the granting
of such security interests can be valid, binding, and enforceable
against Subsidiary with the certainty required by commercial
practice will be the focus of this Article.
I.

DESIRABILITY OF UPSTREAM GUARANTIES

Several different circumstances in which loans to Parent are
commonly made can be distinguished. Where Parent is a holding
company with several subsidiaries in addition to Subsidiary, or
has substantial assets in addition to its interest in Subsidiary, Parent may have the ability to borrow larger amounts of money at
more favorable rates than would normally be offered to Subsidiary, and may be able to provide for the financial needs of all its
affiliated businesses with one borrowing. Subsidiary may be subject to regulatory or contractual restrictions on borrowing which
require that Parent seek funds on its behalf, or Parent may wish
for a variety of staff or public relations motives to keep its
financial arrangements separate from the affairs of Subsidiary. If
Subsidiary holds a substantial portion of Parent's consolidated assets, the lender may insist on the additional protection of Subsidiary's guaranty or grant of security interests. For the purposes of
analysis, the following example ("Holding Company Example") is
designed to capture the characteristics of a loan to a holding company for the purpose of financing its business operations.
Holding Company owns all of the issued and outstanding common stock of Operating Companies 1, 2, 3, and 4. Except for
some office furniture, equipment, and supplies, Holding Company has no assets other than the common stock of Operating
Companies 1, 2, 3, and 4, which have no security holders other
than Holding Company. Operating Companies 1, 2, 3, and 4
each own substantial real and personal property. Operating
Companies 1, 2, and 3 each have a net worth of $15,000,000.
Operating Company 4 has a net worth of only $10,000. Each of
Operating Companies 1, 2, 3, and 4 needs additional funds for
working capital. Holding Company proposes to borrow
$20,000,000 from Bank. Because Holding Company has no as5. Of course, the fact that the management of Parent and Subsidiary may feel
obliged as a matter of principle to honor the guaranty or grant of security is of little value
to the lender. At the time when the lender is forced to collect on the guaranty or foreclose
on the secured property, the lender will most likely be facing a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy who is under a strict duty to raise every legal defense to defeat claims against Subsidiary.
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sets other than stock of Operating Companies 1, 2, 3, and 4,
Bank insists that the loan be guaranteed by each of Operating
Companies 1, 2, 3, and 4 and secured by security interests in
their respective inventories and accounts receivable.
Another situation in which an upstream guaranty may be encountered is that of a leveraged acquisition. Here, Parent borrows
the money required to purchase all of the outstanding stock of
Subsidiary. The lender insists that, once the purchase is complete,
the loan be secured by a guaranty by the new Subsidiary and security interests in Subsidiary's property. This situation is reflected
in the following example ("Acquisition Example").
Buyer Company is formed by a syndicate of wealthy investors
to purchase all of the outstanding stock of Target Company.
Target Company has substantial assets and a net worth of
$4,200,000. Buyer Company has no assets except for $200,000
of capital paid in by its shareholders. Buyer Company intends
to borrow $4,000,000 from Bank and to purchase all of the issued and outstanding capital stock of Target Company for an
aggregate purchase price equal to its book value of $4,200,000.
To avoid direct responsibility for Target Company's liabilities
and to preserve Target Company's valuable contracts which
cannot be assigned, Buyer Company intends to maintain Target Company's existence. Bank insists that, immediately after
the purchase, Buyer Company cause Target Company to guarantee the loan to Buyer Company and to grant a security interest in all of Target Company's real or personal property.
As will be discussed below, the validity of Target Company's
guaranty of the financing of such a leveraged acquisition is a particularly difficult problem because the benefits which Target Company receives from such financing can be remote.
The above examples may not occur on a daily basis, but they
are far from rare.6 Because Parent and Subsidiary are part of a
single economic unit, it is both logical and desirable that Parent be
able to borrow based on the value of its subsidiaries' property and
assets and that lenders be able to enjoy the full amount of protection which the borrower can make available. Clear legal treatment of these transactions would enable borrowers and lenders to
6. For a case involving a leveraged acquisition, see Roxbury State Bank v. The Clarendon, 129 N.J. Super. 358, 324 A.2d 24 (1974). Similar problems arise where the selling
shareholders help to finance the acquisition by agreeing to accept a deferred purchase
price. See Hartwell v. Hartwell Co., Inc., 167 N.J. Super. 91, 400 A.2d 529 (1979); In re
Knox Kreations, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Haynie v. Milan Exchange, Inc.,
62 Tenn. App. 36,458 S.W.2d 23 (1970); Miller's Shoes and Clothing v. Hawkins Furniture
and Appliances, Inc., 300 Minn. 460, 221 N.W.2d 113 (1974); Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 639
(1976).
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enjoy commercially required confidence in the effectiveness of
their arrangements, but the law relating to upstream guaranties
and associated grants of security interests is at present difficult to
determine and to apply.7 Commentators have recently suggested
that Subsidiary may not have corporate authority to guarantee or
to secure Parent's indebtedness8 and that such a guaranty or grant
of security interest is likely to be voidable under the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyances Act. 9 Counsel to lender, Parent, and
Subsidiary should be aware that Subsidiary's guaranty of Parent's
debts may not be valid, binding, or enforceable in certain circumstances. This is a major problem for lender's counsel who must be
able to confirm that a loan being made to Parent in part in reliance on the strength of Subsidiary's property and assets is secured

by a guaranty which is enforceable against Subsidiary in all
events. If the lender relies on s&urity interests in Subsidiary's

property, lender's counsel must also ensure that such security interests are effective against other creditors of Subsidiary. These
issues become problems for counsel to Parent and Subsidiary
when the lender insists on a legal opinion from such counsel on

the validity and enforceability of the guaranty and grant of security interests.
The remainder of this Article attempts to assist counsel in

thinking through the problems posed by a guaranty or grant of
security interests in instances similar to those described above.
There are a variety of issues."° Part II deals with Subsidiary's cor7. One commentator recently summarized the state of the law as follows:
In summary, the attorney for the lender whose positive credit judgment requires a collateralized or noncollateralized "cross-stream" or "upstream" corporate guaranty of the lending transaction faces a morass of problems in
determining the validity of the obligation under the statutory provisions: sparse,
confusing, and poorly written statutes; poorly rationalized and articulated case
law; a dearth of recent interpretive case law on some central concepts; and a
dearth of any case law at all on others.
Rosenberg, IntercorporateGuarantiesand the Law of FraudulentConveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 235, 257 (1976). To many attorneys, the above is a description of
business as usual.
8. See Note, The Corporate Guaranty Revisited. Upstream, Downstream, and Beyond-A Statutory Approach, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 312 (1979); Note, Upstream Financing
and Use of the Corporate Guaranty. 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 841 (1978); Annot., 71
A.L.R.3d 639 (1976).
9. See Rosenberg, supra note 7.
10. The issue of whether consideration exists for an upstream guaranty and the related
grant of security interests appears to be easily resolved, for in almost every case there will
have been detrimental reliance by the lender on the guaranty. See Woods Lumber Co. v.
Moore, 183 Cal. 497, 191 P. 405 (1920); New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Lost Valley
Corp., 400 A.2d 1178, 1181 (N.H. 1979); 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 121 (1963); Everdell
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porate authority to make the guaranty or grant security interests.
While the doctrine of corporate ultra vires is in decline with respect to corporate guaranties, I the question of corporate authority
still has substance where minority or preferred shareholders are
present. 2 Part III deals with the restrictions which may apply to
constructive distributions to shareholders. A guaranty or grant of
security interests in violation of these could be avoided by other
creditors. Part IV analyzes the applicable restrictions on conveyances which might be voidable as fraudulent to creditors. While
acknowledging several of the problems which have recently troubled commentators, this three-part analysis reaches the more positive conclusion that, in appropriate cases and with careful drafting
and design, upstream guaranties and the associated grants of security interests can be made to work under existing law.
The precise statutory provisions are fundamental to the analysis of these questions. Although the exact statutory language
which may be applicable in a particular case will vary from state
to state, most issues discussed are common to all states. This Article will discuss each issue specifically in the context of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (UFCA) and the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA); reference will also be made to
the provisions of the corporation and fraudulent conveyance laws
of California, Delaware, New York, and Ohio.
II.

CORPORATE AUTHORITY

Although the role of the ultra vires doctrine has been significantly circumscribed under modem corporation laws,13 the existence of corporate power and authority is not merely academic.
Under section 7 of the MBCA, a court may be persuaded by
shareholders to enjoin performance of a contract for lack of corporate authority, or the directors and officers may be held person& Longstreth, supra note 3, at 501 n.4. But see Miller's Shoes and Clothing v. Hawkins
Furniture and Appliances, Inc., 300 Minn. 460, 468, 221 N.W.2d 113, 118 (1974). In the
Acquisition Example, there is a "past consideration" problem because the loan must be
extended prior to the making of the guaranty or the grant of security by Target Company,
but this problem appears to be solvable by making the loan on a demand note basis or by
making the failure to guarantee or to grant the security interests an event of default.
11. See MBCA § 7; CAL. CORP. CODE § 208 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 124 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 203 (McKinney 1963); Note, Upstream Financingand
Use of the CorporateGuaranty,supra note 8, at 845-46. But see Kreidmann, The Corporate
Guaranty, 13 VAND. L. REV. 229 (1959).
12. See, e.g., Real Estate Capital Corp. v. Thunder Corp., 31 Ohio Misc. 169, 287
N.E.2d 838 (C.P. 1972).
13. See note 11 supra.
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ally liable for such actions on the suit of a receiver or the
shareholders.' 4 These are, of course, exactly the problems that
counsel for Subsidiary has been retained to avoid.
Subsidiary's corporate authority to guarantee or to secure Par-

ent's obligations is determined not only by statute but also by the
provisions of its articles of incorporation and its bylaws. This discussion proceeds on the assumption that counsel has determined

that neither Subsidiary's articles of incorporation nor its bylaws
by their terms restrict Subsidiary's authority to guarantee or to
secure the obligations of any party. Even so, counsel may find it
desirable to amend the articles of incorporation to take advantage
of the full breadth of powers permitted under modem state corporation statutes.
Under the MBCA, as with other modem state corporation

statutes, there is little restriction on a corporation's purposes; in
general, Subsidiary may be organized for and pursue "any lawful
purpose."' 5 Because there is nothing unlawful in the guaranty
which Subsidiary intends to make or the security interests which
Subsidiary intends to grant, there should be no exposure to a
charge that its actions exceed the statutory limits on the purposes
of corporations. Nevertheless, purposes stated in Subsidiary's arti-

cles of incorporation remain important because they may define
Subsidiary's purposes more narrowly than the full breadth al-

lowed by statute.
Only a few of the general powers of a corporation enumerated
14. Similar remedies are available in California, Delaware, and New York. See
sources cited in note II supra. In California, shareholders can enjoin ultra vires transactions only "where third parties have not acquired rights thereby." CAL. CORP.CODE § 208
(West 1977). In Ohio, the ultra vires defense is also allowed in the case of an overissue of
shares. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(H) (Page 1978). Both California and Ohio apply
their limitations on the ultra vires defense to contracts of foreign corporations. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 208 (West 1977); OHto REV.CODE ANN. § 1701.13(H) (Page 1978).
15. The MBCA provides: "Corporations may be organized under this Act for any
lawful purpose or purposes, except for the purpose of banking or insurance." MBCA § 3.
State statutes generally permit incorporation for any lawful activity. E.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE § 206 (West 1977) (permitting "any business activity not prohibited by the respective
statutes and regulations to which it is subject"); N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW § 201(a) (McKinney
1963) (permitting "any lawful business purpose or purposes"); OHio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.03 (Page 1978) (permitting "any purpose or purposes ... for which natural persons
lawfully may associate themselves .. ").The references to "business" activities and purposes in the California and New York statutes suggest that those statutes are more restrictive in that they provide a statutory basis for the argument that a gratuitous guaranty is not
related to "business" and therefore is not within Subsidiary's permitted corporate purposes.
The Delaware statute negates such an inference by allowing "any lawful business or purposes." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (1975) (emphasis added).
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in section 4 of the MBCA are relevant to guaranties and grants of
security interests.1 6 Those relating to guaranties will be dealt with
first.
Although section 4(h) of the MBCA' 7 seems to permit guaranties without limitation,"8 the accompanying commentary is ambiguous. It first states that "some more recent statutes have made the
power to contract a general power, not limited by corporate purposes. The Model Act has adopted this course with respect to the
powers listed in Section 4(h)."' 9 This part of the commentary
seems to contemplate an unrestricted power to guarantee the debts
of anyone with or without a corporate business purpose or benefit
from the guaranty. Later, however, the commentary seems to suggest a more restrictive "benefit" or "business purpose" test:
"Guaranties should be upheld if it is shown that the board of directors of the guarantor had in good faith, and in the exercise of
reasonable business judgment, decided that the benefits derived
16. Section 4 provides in pertinent part:
Each corporation shall have power.
(e) To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and otherwise
dispose of all or any part of its property and assets.
(f) To lend money and use its credit to assist its employees.
(h) To make contracts and guarantees and incur liabilities, borrow money at
such rates of interest as the corporation may determine, issue its notes, bonds, and
other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by mortgage or pledge of all or
any of its property, franchises and income.
(i) To lend money for its corporate purposes, invest and reinvest its funds,
and take and hold real and personal property as security for the payment of funds
so loaned or invested.
(q) To have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect its purposes.
MBCA § 4.
17. See note 19 infra.
18. See, e.g., New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Lost Valley Corp., 400 A.2d 1178
(N.H. 1979). Delaware also expressly grants corporations the unrestricted power to guarantee. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(13) (1975). New York and Ohio permit guaranties
only in furtherance of corporate purposes, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(13) (McKinney
1963); OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 1701.13(F)(6) (Page 1978), although New York has an
express provision authorizing corporate guaranties without restriction as to purpose where
the requisite shareholder vote is obtained. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 908 (McKinney 1963);
The Ohio statute has been held to permit a cross-stream quaranty. See In re B-F Building
Corp., 284 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1960). See Note, The Corporate Guaranty Revisited.- Upstream, DownstreamandBeyond-4 StatutoryApproach, supranote 8, at 317-27. The California statute continues to utilize the "business" concept by permitting a corporation to
guarantee "in carrying out its business activities." CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(g) (West 1977).
California has a particular provision governing guaranties of obligations of employees,
directors, officers, and shareholders. Id. § 315.
19. MBCA § 4(h), Comment.
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from the guaranties were sufficient to justify the liability incurred." 20 The use of the word "benefits" in the commentary is
troublesome for several reasons. First, such a test lacks any apparent basis in the language of section 4(h). Second, it seems to
refer back to the common law benefit rule which restricted the
power of corporations to make guaranties. 2 1 The broad powers of
contract, including the power to guarantee, contained in section
4(h) were drafted to correct this and other restrictive rules which
injected uncertainty into corporate transactions.22 Third, in addition to being restrictive, the benefit or business purpose test is
vague. Of course there are cases where a business purpose clearly
exists, such as where a guaranty helps to secure a source of supply
or helps to sell a product. In other cases, however, imaginative
counsel have been and will continue to be able to claim that business purposes exist in a wide range of direct and indirect benefits
to a corporation. 23 With each exercise of imagination, the certainty required for commercial transactions is undercut, and the
requirement of a benefit or business purpose becomes less meaningful.
However such a benefit or business purpose test is defined,
whether it is met in Subsidiary's guaranty of Parent's debt may be
a complicated issue turning on the facts of the case. Where Parent
guarantees Subsidiary's debt, a benefit or business purpose is
clearly present because any contribution to Subsidiary's financial
strength enhances Parent's equity interest. In contrast, a borrowing by Parent may or may not be of assistance to Subsidiary. The
benefit to Subsidiary may be obvious where Parent exists only as a
holding company for Subsidiary's stock, because the funds borrowed by Parent will be advanced or contributed to Subsidiary. In
the Holding Company Example, if all or a substantial part of
Holding Company's borrowing of $20,000,000 is contributed to
Operating Company 1, the receipt of funds on favorable terms
would constitute a sufficiently direct and substantial benefit to Operating Company 1 to satisfy any benefit or business purpose test
for its guaranty or grant of security interests. The benefit to Operating Companies 2, 3, and 4 is less clear because all or a substan20. Id.
21. See Kreidmann, supra note 11, at 232-34; Note, The CorporateGuarantyRevisitedUpstream, Downstream, andBeyond - A StatutoryApproach, supra note 8, at 314-16.
22. See MBCA § 4(h), Comment.
23. Compare Miller's Shoes and Clothing v. Hawkins Furniture and Appliances, Inc.,
300 Minn. at 468-71, 221 N.W.2d at 119-20 with Haynie v. Milan Exchange, Inc., 62 Tenn.
App. at 43-45, 458 S.W.2d at 27.
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tial part of the loan proceeds is directed elsewhere. It is easy to
conceive of a case where Parent might wish to cause its successful
subsidiaries to guarantee a loan which would provide financial
support for a struggling subsidiary. In the Holding Company Example, if the entire $20,000,000 is advanced to Operating Company 4 to support its sagging balance sheet, the requisite benefit to
Operating Companies 1, 2, and 3 exists only insofar as a general
strengthening of the related group is recognized as meeting the
test.
In the context of a purchase of Subsidiary's shares by Parent
with takeover financing, it will be even more difficult for Subsidiary to show the required benefit for its guaranty of the loan to
Parent. In the Acquisition Example, Buyer Company pays the
loan proceeds to the former shareholders of Target Company;
Target Company itself receives no financial benefit from the loan
to Buyer Company, nor is there any strengthening of Target Company's related corporate group because the loan proceeds have
gone out of the group.
As suggested above, imaginative counsel may find a sufficient
indirect benefit or business purpose even in such situations. The
financial strength of Parent, including the strength of its subsidiaries and its other operations, is clearly of concern to Subsidiary. In
good times, a financially strong Parent is a good source of inexpensive financial and other support and may be an important
customer. In bad times, the bankruptcy of Parent can bring pressure and even liquidation on Subsidiary. Such considerations
have been judicially recognized.2' Even in the takeover situation,
Subsidiary may claim a benefit if the new Parent brings stronger
management, financial resources, or other expertise which will be
shared with Subsidiary. If a refusal by Subsidiary to guarantee
Parent's debt were to constitute a default on the loan or to cause
the lender to call its demand note, the consequences to Subsidiary
could be adverse. Unfortunately, even these benefits to Subsidiary may not exist in every case.
Finally, a further difficulty exists in the MBCA commentary's
reference to an exercise of "good faith" business judgment by the
guarantor's directors.2 5 Even where a benefit or business purpose
24. See, e.g., In the Matter of Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp., 578 F.2d 904, 906-07 (2d
Cir. 1978) (guaranty and security agreement by subsidiary served a valid corporate purpose, so that shareholder ratification was unnecessary, because executed in an attempt to
avoid the bankruptcy of the parent and principal customer).
25. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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for the guaranty could be established, one must inevitably suspect
the objectivity of Subsidiary's directors when considering the benefit to Subsidiary in guaranteeing Parent's obligations - it is an
offer Subsidiary cannot refuse.
A benefit or business purpose test is therefore troublesome and
unsuited to the standards of certainty required for commercial
transactions and accompanying legal opinions.26 Fortunately, the

benefit or business purpose test is probably not the law today, at
least in those states where corporations are granted unlimited
power to contract. 27 Not only does section 4(h) of the MBCA con-

tain no restriction on the power to contract or to guarantee, but
other general corporate powers under the MBCA are consistent

with the making of guaranties in conformity with Subsidiary's
corporate purposes. Because the guaranty contract is akin to lend-

ing money, one could argue either that authority for the guaranty
exists under MBCA section 4(i) (dealing with the power to loan
money) or that the statute could not have intended to restrict a
corporation's power to make guaranties more than it restricts its
power to make loans.2 8 In addition, there is the catchall provision
in section 4 (q) which gives a corporation power to exercise "all
'29
powers necessary and convenient to effect its purpose.

Both sections 4(i) and 4(q) permit such action by a corporation
to effect its corporate purposes. At first blush this limitation on
corporate purposes appears to be no better than the restrictive
business purpose standard. If broadly drawn, however, a corporation's purposes can, as discussed above, 30 go beyond business pur-

poses to include "any lawful purpose." Section 54 of the MBCA
26. How attorneys can adequately satisfy themselves as to factual matters which underlie their opinions is a topic beyond the scope of this Article. It may not be enough
simply to obtain a certificate from an officer of Subsidiary reciting the ultimate facts, because those relying on the opinion may quite reasonably assume that, in giving the opinion,
counsel is considering a variety of more detailed facts which might be expected to come to
his or her attention in the course of the transaction. Both the question of purpose and the
issue of solvency, referred to in Part IV, require counsel to become thoroughly familiar
with the business and financial condition of Parent and Subsidiary.
27. Such a test may well apply in certain cases, especially where Subsidiary's articles
of incorporation recite only a particular line of business as the corporation's purpose or in
the case of a state where the power of a corporation to contract remains limited to stated
business activities. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. In such a case, it may be
that guaranties could be made only in furtherance of Subsidiary's stated purposes. See,
£e.,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 207 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1963);
OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(F) (Page 1978).
28. For the text of section 4(i), see note 16 supra.
29. For the text of section 4(q), see note 16 supra.
30. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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and the commentary to section 3 make it clear that the purpose
clause in a corporation's articles of incorporation need not be any
more descriptive or detailed than that.31 If Subsidiary's articles of
incorporation contain a broad purpose clause reciting that its purposes include any lawful business or activity, then Subsidiary's
guaranty of Parent's debt comes within the powers recited in sections 4(i) and 4 (q) because the guaranty is lawful and therefore

within Subsidiary's purposes.32

Subsidiary's authority to transact any lawful business is also a

helpful basis for its authority to give security for Parent's debt.
Section 4(e) of the MBCA gives Subsidiary power "[t]o sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and otherwise dis-

pose of all or any part of its property and assets" without any
express limitation as to business purpose, 33 but section 4(h) grants
a general power to "secure any of its obligations by mortgage or

pledge of all or any of its property, franchises and income." 34 By
31. Section 54 of the MBCA provides:
The articles of incorporation shall set forth
(c) The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized which may
be stated to be, or to include, the transaction of any or all lawful business for
which corporations may be incorporated under this Act.
Ohio and Delaware similarly permit the articles of incorporation to include a broad and
general statement of purpose. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 102(a)(3) (1975); OHIO REv. CODE
CODE ANN. § 1701.04(A)(3) (Page 1978). California requires such a statement. CAL.
CORP. § 202(b) (West 1977).
The commentary to MBCA section 3 provides background as follows:
Delaware, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and
Wyoming, among others, permit the charter to state that the corporation will engage in "any lawful activity," without further specifications. In other jurisdictions
the charter must state with varying degrees of exactness the nature of the business
or businesses for which the corporation is organized.
In 1969, the Committee concluded that the broad grant concerning purposes
in section 3 should be given full effect by removing the requirement in form or
section 48(c) that the articles specify the purposes. As a consequence that section
(now section 54) was amended appropriately and the Model Act now follows the
pattern of those states permitting the "all purpose" provision.
32. Some argument could be made that, while the guaranty is lawful, it is not "business." This argument does not even arise in some states where the "all purpose" provision
refers to any lawful "activity," instead of referring to any lawful "business." Eg., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (1975); OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 1701.03 (Page 1978). To say that
Subsidiary's guaranty is not transacting business is to take the position that a standard
business arrangement which is required by the lender in the ordinary course of its business
is not transacting business merely because of the questionable business purposes of Subsidiary. Such a construction is contrary to the spirit of the broad grant concerning corporate
purposes which the commentary to MBCA § 3 indicates that section was meant to provide.
See note 31 supra. In short, it appears possible to have a business transaction without a
business purpose.
33. MBCA § 4(e).
34. Id. § 4(h).
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referring to "its obligations" the latter language is more limited,
and it raises the question whether Subsidiary has the power to
secure the obligations of another person. 35 Still, where Subsidiary
has made a guaranty, the security interest secures "its obligations"
and, in any event, the catchall provisions of section 4(q) 36 coupled
with a broad purpose clause would further support the conclusion
that corporate authority exists for the grant bf security interests.
If due precautions are taken,3 7 corporate authority should exist
for Subsidiary to guarantee Parent's obligations and grant security
interests to support the guaranty. The conclusion that the MBCA
allows such a guaranty and grant of security interests accords with
the spirit of flexible and broad corporate powers and with the realities of business relationships. Setting aside the legal details of the
MBCA and the separate corporate entities, Parent and Subsidiary
are, after all, only one consolidated business enterprise serving the
financial interests of Parent's shareholders and obeying the orders
of Parent's directors. A simple merger would make the legal configuration identical to this economic configuration. To be workable and helpful, the corporate law should facilitate, rather than
complicate and hinder, a choice to transact business by pooling
credit on a consolidated basis. Indeed, the entire analysis of corporate authority has a flavor of unreality to it, given the general
35. The reference to "its obligations" also appears in the California, Delaware, and
New York statutes. CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(g) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 122(13) (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(7) (McKinney 1963). The Ohio law refers
more broadly to "the obligations of any person." OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(F)(6)
(Page 1978).
36. For the text of section 4(q), see note 16 supra.
37. Two practical points should be noted. First, if Subsidiary's articles of incorporation do not contain the broad statement of purposes permitted by MBCA § 54, counsel will
want to have the articles amended to include such a statement in order to provide the
greatest possible support for the existence of corporate authority. Second, this discussion
has assumed that Subsidiary has no shareholders other than Parent. If other shareholders
do exist, then not only is there concern that a disproportionate benefit is being received by
one shareholder, Parent, but also the corporate authority question is more acute because of
the existence of a potential plaintiff. In Ohio, for example, a court has enunciated, without
undertaking a discussion of the statutory powers of corporations, a rule that a "gratuitous
guarantee" by a corporation is valid if and only if all of the shareholders consent. E.g.,
Real Estate Capital Corp. v. Thunder Corp., 31 Ohio Misc. 169, 176-77, 287 N.E.2d 838,
843 (C.P. 1972) (applying MacQueen v. The Dollar Savings Bank Co., 133 Ohio St. 579,
715 N.E.2d 529 (1938)). See also Roxbury State Bank v. The Clarendon, 129 NJ. Super.
358, 370-71, 324 A.2d 24, 30 (1974); Haynie v. Milan Exchange, Inc., 62 Tenn. App. 36, 44,
458 S.W.2d 23, 27 (1970); Miller's Shoes and Clothing v. Hawkins Furniture and Appliances, Inc., 300 Minn. 460, 465-66, 221 N.W.2d 113, 117 (1974). In New York, a shareholder vote will insulate the guaranty from attack. See note 18 supra. A formal consent to
the transaction by all of Subsidiary's shareholders would therefore appear to be a worthwhile precaution.
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assumption that Subsidiary has only one shareholder. 38 If there is
only one shareholder, or if all of the shareholders have consented,
the only protectable interests are those of creditors. The protection
of these interests is the inspiration for the restrictions on distributions and conveyances discussed in the next two parts. Where
there are no minority shareholder interests to protect, the most
rational treatment of upstream guaranties is to apply limitations
based on the rules particularly designed for the protection of creditors, rather than impose restrictions based on the theory of inadequate corporate authority.3 9
III.

CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS,

DISTRIBUTIONS, OR LOANS TO SHAREHOLDERS

Once the requirement of corporate authority has been satisfied, the guaranty and grant of security interests must be shown to
meet the existing legal requirements for protecting Subsidiary's
creditors. A major creditor may have obtained covenants from
Subsidiary restricting the making of guaranties or granting of security interests. Assuming that no such contractual limitations exist, the principal restrictions in this context are (1) the statutory
restrictions on distributions to shareholders and other affiliated
persons and (2) the statutory restrictions on fraudulent conveyances discussed in Part IV.
If Subsidiary's guaranty and grant of security interests are
characterized as a dividend, distribution, or loan to Parent of Subsidiary's credit or other assets, then they will be subject to restrictions under several provisions of the MBCA. Most important, the
MBCA permits dividends and distributions in cash or property to
shareholders only out of earned or capital surplus and only when
the corporation is not insolvent or rendered insolvent by the dividend or distribution.4' If Subsidiary is called on to make payment on its guaranty or the lender forecloses on the security
interest and Subsidiary actually makes payments or transfers to
38. See note 35 supra.
39. See Hartwell v. Hartwell Co., Inc., 167 N.J. Super. 91, 96, 400 A.2d 529, 532
(1979); Roxbury State Bank v. The Clarendon, 129 N.J. Super. 358, 372-73, 324 A.2d 24,
31(1974).
40. MBCA §§ 45, 46. See note 2 supra. The California statute goes further, prohibiting dividends and distributions where the corporation would be "likely to be unable to
meet its liabilities ... as they mature." CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (West 1977).
If Subsidiary is rendered insolvent by making the guaranty and granting the security,
there are further problems under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act. Discussion of
these problems is deferred to Part IV infra.
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benefit Parent, such payments or transfers might be characterized
as a dividend or a distribution to its shareholder at that time. Such
a characterization might mean that if Subsidiary were to have become insolvent by that time, performance of its obligations under
the guaranty would be an illegal dividend. Because the solvency
of Subsidiary at a time several years in the future is never certain,
characterization of the performance on the guaranty as a dividend
or as a distribution to its shareholder would create a substantial
uncertainty concerning the enforceability of the guaranty or the
related security interests. Moreover, Subsidiary's directors will be
interested to know that they are personally liable for the amount
of any illegal dividends or distributions to shareholders." Finally, where there are minority shareholders, there is the additional problem that any dividend or distribution will not be pro

rata.
Unlike some state statutes,42 the MBCA does not expressly restrict loans by a corporation to its shareholders.4 3 The accompanying commentary, however, states: "Use of corporate funds for
other than corporate purposes is improper. Even the sole stockholder is not entitled to use corporate funds for his individual purposes."' Again, counsel is faced with a broad statement in the
commentary which is not supported by the statutory language.
The many possible interpretations of the word "use" are particularly troublesome. One may wonder whether by obtaining Subsidiary's guaranty Parent is "using" the assets of Subsidiary that
stand behind the guaranty or that are subjected to a lien to secure
the guaranty. The broadest possible meaning of the word "use"
appears to cover too many accepted forms of intercorporate dealing between Parent and Subsidiary, and it may be that the commentary is intended to refer to commingling of funds or similar
practices rather than loans or documented intercorporate advances.
Whether recharacterization of the guaranty and grant of security as a loan, dividend, or distribution is at all supportable will
depend on the facts of the case. Where the proceeds of the loan to
41. See MBCA § 48; CAL. CORP. CODE § 316 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

§ 174 (1975) (liability only for willful or negligent acts); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.95
(Page 1978).
42. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.95(A)(3) (Page 1978).
43. See MBCA § 47. See also CAL. CORP.CODE § 315 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 143 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 714 (McKinney 1963).

44. MBCA § 47, Comment.
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Parent flow through to Subsidiary, such a recharacterization
clearly would not be justified. Where the loan proceeds come to
rest in Parent or are used to pay off former shareholders in an
acquisition, the similarity to a dividend, distribution, or loan is
stronger, for Subsidiary's action has indirectly resulted in the receipt of funds by Parent. Nevertheless, such a recharacterization
still would be inappropriate in most cases. There is no precedent
for such a recharacterization known to the author, and courts have
held that the terms "dividend" and "loan" in a statute or contract
refer to such actions in their usual form.45 In particular, the fact
that any payment by Subsidiary on its guaranty would create a
right of subrogation against Parent is inconsistent with the concept
of a dividend or distribution.
Furthermore, the restrictions in the statute designed to govern
simple dividends and distributions are ill-suited for the particular
mechanics of a guaranty or grant of security interests. Unlike the
usual dividend or distribution, which would be paid or made
shortly after being declared, Subsidiary's guaranty is a contingent
obligation which may never require payment, and any payment
which is made will probably have to be made after passage of
considerable time and under changed circumstances. Therefore,
restrictions which ordinarily define legal and illegal dividends and
distributions with reasonable certainty would fail to give clear
guidance regarding the validity of upstream guaranties and security interests. The real concern of the law in this area is that creditors' interests be protected, and for transactions in the form of a
guaranty or grant of security such protection is more appropriately afforded by the UFCA.
IV.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

It should come as no surprise that fraudulent conveyances do
45. With respect to dividends, see, e.g., Rano, Inc. v. English, 500 S.W.2d 461, 465
('rex. 1973) ("dividend" ordinarily means a corporate distribution that the shareholder is
entitled to receive and retain without repayment); Northwest Eng'r Corp. v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Tax, 241 Wis. 324, 327, 6 N.W.2d 198, 199 (1942) (dividend does not include profit
received by purchaser of discounted stock). As to loans, see, e.g., Pratt v. Robert S. Odell
& Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 550, 559, 122 P.2d 684, 689 (1942) (loan is a contract by which one
party delivers a sum of money to the other party for which the second party agrees to
return an equivalent sum at a future date); State v. O'Brien, 93 Conn. 643, 647, 107 A. 520,
522 (1919) (loan creates an absolute obligation, while guaranteeing a loan merely creates a
conditional duty to pay a debt or perform an act in the event of a failure to do so by a party
originally liable).
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not receive sympathetic treatment under the law.46 Where a conveyance is fraudulent as to creditors, section 9 of the UFCA provides that a creditor with a matured claim may
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to
the extent necessary to satisfy his claim, or
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution
upon the property conveyed. 47
Under section 10, a creditor whose claim has not matured may
request the court to
(a) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property,
(b) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the property,
(c) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation, or
(d) Make any order which the circumstances of the case
may require.48
Similarly, under federal law a trustee in bankruptcy can avoid a
fraudulent transfer made within one year of bankruptcy. 49 As a
result, a commercial lender is unlikely to be willing to rely on a
guaranty or security interest which might be deemed a fraudulent
conveyance.
As stated earlier, because Subsidiary is by hypothesis whollyowned, the only interests which are affected by the validity of the
guaranty and grant of security interests are the relative rights of
Parent's lender and Subsidiary's creditors. After all, the principal
purpose of the guaranty and grant of security interests is to place
Parent's lender in a position equal to or ahead of Subsidiary's
creditors in the event that the loan goes into default and the
financial condition of Parent and Subsidiary weakens. The principal test of validity for upstream guaranties and associated grants
of security interests should be based on the laws which most direcily relate to the protection of Subsidiary's creditors. Therefore,
in passing from the problems of corporate authority and restrictions on dividends to the question of fraudulent conveyances, the
discussion appears to have passed from technicality to substance.
Unfortunately, while the provisions of the UFCA clearly apply to
46. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act has been adopted by a bare majority
of the states. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 3439-3439.12 (West 1977); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED.
LAW §§ 270-281 (McKinney 1963); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1336.01-,12 (Page 1978).
The language of the federal bankruptcy provision relating to fraudulent transfers incorporates the UFCA tests. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a) (1979).
47. UNIFORM FRAUD. CoNv. Acr § 9 [hereinafter cited as UFCA].

48. Id. § 10.
49. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (1979).
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upstream guaranties and related grants of security interests,5"
there have been few decided cases and little commentary on the
application of the UFCA or analogous bankruptcy statutes to upstream guaranties.
It is particularly disheartening to find that the rules governing
fraudulent conveyances are difficult to apply to upstream guaranties and related security interests. In a recent article on the subject, Robert Rosenberg concluded that the difficulties encountered
present such problems that unless the loan can be restructured to
run directly to Subsidiary "the lender should treat the availability
of the assets of a Subsidiary. . .for repayment of the obligations
of the borrower as a bonus rather than a necessity."' 5 1 In light of
the UFCA's fundamental importance and the need for certainty in
lending transactions, such a conclusion translates to a finding that
the upstream guaranty is not available as an effective financing
device when it is really needed. The following analysis takes issue
with that conclusion and attempts to demonstrate that, in appropriate circumstances, the upstream guaranty and related grant of
security interests will not constitute fraudulent conveyances under
the UFCA.52
As stated before, there can be no doubt that Subsidiary's guaranty and pledge of security are subject to the provisions of the
UFCA. That Act applies to "conveyance[s] made" and "obligation[s] incurred. 5 3 "Obligations" is not defined in the UFCA, but
its ordinary meaning would cover a guaranty. 54 "Conveyance" is
defined in section 1 of the UFCA as "every payment of money,
assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge of tangible
or intangible property, and also the creation of any lien or incumbrance. 55 It follows that in making its guaranty, Subsidiary has
"incurred an obligation" and, in granting the security interests,
Subsidiary has "made a conveyance" for purposes of the UFCA.
Under the UFCA, conveyances made and obligations incurred
become fraudulent in either of two situations. The first situation
50. See notes 54-55 infra and accompanying text. See also Zellerbach Paper Co. v.
Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 13 Ariz. App. 431, 477 P.2d 550 (1970).
51. Rosenburg, supra note 7, at 265.
52. This analysis is supported by the decision of the Second Circuit in In the Matter of
Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp., 578 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1978).
53. UFCA § 4.
54. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 240-41; see also Blakely v. Superior Ct. of Pima
County, 429 P.2d 493, 494 (Ariz. App. 1967).
55. UFCA § 1.
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is where there exists actual intent to hinder creditors." The second
situation is where the corporation does not receive fair consideration and either becomes insolvent, 57 retains an unreasonably small
amount of capital,5 8 or is about to incur debts which it will be
unable to repay.59 Each test will be analyzed in turn.
In normal commercial transactions, there is nothing in Subsidiary's guaranty and grant of security interests which would exhibit
an intent to hinder creditors. The UFCA refers to "actual intent,
as distinguished from intent presumed in law." 60 The inspiration
behind the transaction is not to put the collateral out of reach of
Subsidiary's creditors but rather to provide the comfort required
by Parent's lender. In short, the intent is not to hinder creditors
but to obtain the loan. The mere fact that the transaction is structured so that Parent's lender obtains a lien on Subsidiary's property which is prior to that of Subsidiary's other creditors does not
evince a fraudulent intent to hinder those crditors any more than
the making of any ordinary secured loan.6 '
If there is no intent to hinder creditors, then the guaranty and
grant of security interests will not be deemed fraudulent as to
creditors if there is "fair consideration." Section 3 of the UFCA
defines fair consideration as follows:
Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation,
(a) when in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a
fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed
or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or
(b) when such property or obligation is received in good
faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount
not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the
property, or obligation obtained.62
Fair consideration for Subsidiary's guaranty is probably determined under paragraph (a), and fair consideration for the grant
of
security interests is governed by paragraph (b).
56. Id. § 7.
57. Id. § 4.
58. Id.§5.
59. Id.§6.
60. Id. § 7.
61. Of course, a different situation would exist if Subsidiary's guaranty and grant of
security interests were to be part of an actual scheme the inspiration of which was to delay
Subsidiary's creditors. In addition, Subsidiary will, of course, need to ensure that adequate
disclosure is made to future creditors when appropriate. Beyond these issues, the problem
created by the "intent to defraud" test is basically one of proof at trial and should not be an
obstacle to counsel, who knows the facts, in giving his or her opinion.
62. UFCA § 3.
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In neither case does the language of the UFCA fit the kind of
consideration which Subsidiary receives in the case of an upstream guaranty. Assuming that there is no antecedent debt, the
existence of fair consideration for the guaranty would depend on
whether "property is conveyed" which is "a fair equivalent" for
the obligation.6 3 The statute, unfortunately, does not specify to
whom the property must be conveyed. Fair consideration for the
grant of security would depend on whether the "present advance"
was "disproportionately small" in comparison with the value of
the property in which the security interest was granted.' Again,
there is no specification as to whom the advance should be made.
However, because the statute is for the protection of Subsidiary's
creditors, the fairness of the consideration logically should be
evaluated from their standpoint.6 5 Since Subsidiary's creditors
have no claim on Parent's assets, one is uncomfortable in considering the amount of property conveyed or advances made to Parent in determining whether Subsidiary has received fair
consideration.6 6
The existence of fair consideration is therefore more safely determined by what Subsidiary has obtained in the transaction.
Some of the funds obtained by Parent may flow through to Subsidiary. In addition, Subsidiary will receive a right to subrogation
to the lender's claim against Parent. If Parent has other subsidiaries, Subsidiary may receive cross-guaranties from the other subsidiaries and a right of contribution in the event that it must
perform on the guaranty. Subsidiary also receives the intangible
benefits of maintaining Parent's financial strength described in
Part II. As a result of its guaranty in the Holding Company Example, Operating Company 1 might receive some portion of the
$20,000,000, a right of subrogation against Holding Company;
rights of contribution from Operating Companies 2, 3, and 4, and
intangible benefits from the increased financial strength of Holding Company and Operating Companies 2, 3, and 4. How much
of this consideration qualifies as "property" or "advances" which
are recognized in determining the existence of fair consideration
63. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 242.
64. See id.
65. See United States v. West, 299 F. Supp. 661, 665 (D. Del. 1969); Patterson v.
Missler, 238 Cal. App. 2d 759, 766, 48 Cal. Rptr. 215, 220 (1965); Larrimer v. Feeney, 411
Pa. 604, 609-10, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (1963); Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank of
Ariz., 477 P.2d 550, 554 (Ariz. App. 1970).
66. See Hansen v. Cramer, 39 Cal. 2d 321, 324-25, 245 P.2d 1059, 1060-61 (1952);
Hollander v. Gautier, 114 N.J. Eq. 485, 487-88, 168 A. 860, 861 (Ch. 1933).

1980]

PARENT CORPORATION DEBT

under the UFCA is not altogether clear. The actual cash received,
although indirectly, clearly should be counted. The benefits of
strengthening Parent's financial status probably must be ignored.6 7 Contract rights, such as the right to contribution, have
been held to come within the scope of "property" for the purpose
of determining fair consideration.6 8 If Subsidiary's contribution
and subrogation rights are taken into account, at least where some
or all of the money that Parent borrows will be advanced to Subsidiary, there may well be fair consideration for Subsidiary's guaranty.
Reason suggests that if there is fair consideration for the guaranty, there will also be fair consideration for the grant of security
interests, 69 but the UFCA's treatment of the grant of security interests is not expressed in parallel language. On the one hand, the
term "advance" in UFCA section 3(b) does not so readily expand
to encompass the package of contract rights to be received by Subsidiary to supplement its share of the proceeds of Parent's borrowing. On the other hand, there appears to be more leeway in the
"disproportionately small" standard applied to the advances than
in the "fair equivalent" standard applied to the property received
for the guaranty. 70 Nevertheless, where the amount of the funds
which flow through to Subsidiary is small in relation to the value
of the property subject to the security interest, neither Parent's
lender nor counsel in the transaction can be certain that fair consideration exists for the grant of security interests.
Fair consideration will also be difficult to demonstrate in the
context of acquisition financing which is guaranteed or secured by
Subsidiary, the former target. For instance, in the Acquisition Example, the proceeds of the loan will go to Target Company's former shareholders and none will be contributed to Target
Company, nor will any remain in Buyer Company for the future
support of Target Company. Fair consideration is therefore likely
to rest entirely on the value of the subrogation and contribution
rights, which value may be highly speculative as a result of Buyer
67. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 243-45. The indirect benefits of strengthening
affiliated companies may be quite significant. For one thing, future borrowings may be
easier to arrange. Nevertheless, such benefits are not easy to classify as "property."
68. Freitag v. The Strand of Atlantic City, Inc., 205 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1953);
Hollander v. Gautier, 114 NJ. Eq. 485, 487, 168 A. 860, 861 (Ch. 1933); Schlecht v.
Schlecht, 168 Minn. 168, 171-72, 209 N.W. 883, 886-87 (1926). But see Angers v. Sabatinelli, 235 Wis. 422, 435, 293 N.W. 173, 179 (1940).
69. See Rosenberg, supra note 7 at 242-43.
70. Id.
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Company's thin capitalization. Finally, one senses that the acquisition financing involves the kind of threat to creditors' interests which a court might feel should be subject to the protection of
the UFCA. In such circumstances, Parent's lender and counsel in
the transaction will want to ensure that the guaranty and grant of
security interests will not be deemed fraudulent even if there is no
fair consideration for them.
In the absence of fair consideration, Subsidiary's guaranty and
grant of security interests will be deemed fraudulent under the
UFCA if Subsidiary "is or will be thereby rendered insolvent,"7 1
if Subsidiary "is engaged or is about to engage in a business or
transaction for which the property remaining in his hands after
the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital", 72 or if Subsidiary "intends or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability
to pay as they mature. '7 3 Of these three tests, only insolvency is
defined in the UFCA and is the subject of much legal learning.
The concepts of unreasonably small capital and inability to pay
foreseen debts present highly factual issues and must be given a
practical meaning. 74 In close cases, counsel will have to rely on
the business judgment of the client or business experts to determine whether capital is unreasonably small or whether foreseen
debts cannot be met. Nevertheless, these determinations merely
complement the central concept of insolvency by assuring that
creditors do not lose their protection by reason of the momentary
solvency of Subsidiary at the time of the transaction.7 5 The crucial underlying concept remains insolvency. Although it is also a
highly factual inquiry, it presents legal as well as factual issues in
the context of an upstream guaranty and associated grant of security.
The UFCA defines insolvency in terms of a formula resembling a balance sheet. Section 3 provides (as to persons other than
partnerships): "A person is insolvent when the present fair salable
71. UFCA§4.
72. Id.§ 5.
73. Id.§6.
74. Barr & Creelman Mill & Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, 109 F.2d 924 (2d Cir.
1940); Cohen v. Hodes, 54 F.2d 680 (E.D.N.Y. 1931); Patterson v. Missler, 238 Cal. App.
2d 759, 48 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1965); Holcomb v. Nunes, 132 Cal. App. 2d 776, 283 P.2d 301
(1955); Cram v. Cram, 262 Mass. 509, 160 N.E. 337 (1928); Zuk v. Hale, 114 N.H. 813, 330
A.2d 448 (1974); In re Decker's Estate, 149 Misc. 364, 268 N.Y.S. 280 (Surf. Ct., 1933);
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 313 Pa. 467, 169 A. 209 (1933); Harnett v. Doyle,
16 Tenn. App. 302, 64 S.W.2d 277 (1932).
75. In so doing, the UFCA incorporates the concept of equitable insolvency. Cellar
Lumber Co. v. Holley, 9 Ohio App. 2d 288, 224 N.E.2d 360 (1967).
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value of his assets is less than the amount that will be required to
pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured. '76 Application of this test in ordinary circumstances may involve considerable complexity. On the asset
side, "present fair salable value" is likely to be different from the
value ascribed to assets on the corporation's regular books or
financial statements based on generally accepted accounting principles.77 Assets which are very valuable to the corporation in its
business but which are hard to sell present a problem, and some
courts would have such assets excluded from the calculation.7 8
On the liability side, contingent liabilities must somehow be measured to determine "probable liability."
-In the case of a sizeable loan to Parent, the treatment of Subsidiary's guaranty and grant of security interests in the calculation
of insolvency is likely to be determinative of the result. If the face
amount of the guaranty must be included on the liability side
without the recognition of any corresponding asset, then Subsidiary is likely to be insolvent under the test set forth in the UFCA.
In Holding Company Example, the face amount of the guaranty
for each of Operating Companies 1, 2, 3, and 4 will far exceed the
net worth of each of them with the possible exception of one of
Operating Companies 1, 2 and 3 if it receives as a contribution to
capital more than $5,000,000 of the loan proceeds. Still, taken as a
consolidated group, their net worth is over two times the maximum liability for the guaranty. In such a case, where the consolidated net worth of Parent and its subsidiaries is several times the
face amount of the loan, it would appear totally unrealistic to
characterize each individual subsidiary as insolvent.
There are two possible approaches for producing a more suitable estimation of solvency. The first, the "Asset Theory," involves
recognizing value in Subsidiary's rights of subrogation and contribution. The second, the "Liability Theory," recognizes a reduction in the amount of Subsidiary's liability on its guaranty to
reflect the small probability that it will have to perform.
Up to this point, this discussion and the Rosenberg analysis
appear to be in substantial agreement. However, Rosenberg appears to reject both the Asset Theory and the Liability Theory,
76. UFCA § 3.
77. F.S. Bowen Elec. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 256 F.2d 46, 49 (4th
Cir. 1958).
78. Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. Supp. 915, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 255.
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while the following discussion attempts to show that the two theories can legitimately be used to establish the validity of upstream
guaranties and related grants of security interests in appropriate
cases.
The Asset Theory is not without conceptual difficulties. In the
first place, there is the doubtful value of a right of subrogation
against a parent who has defaulted on its obligation and is probably insolvent. Rosenberg characterizes the Asset Theory as unrealistic:
The notion that the guaranty of a solvent obligor is offset by a
contingent asset based on the right of subrogation is simply not
realistic; when and if the grantor is called upon to perform, the
value of that contingent asset in all likelihood would be discounted severely because it probably would be no longer collectible. Otherwise, the guarantor would not have been called
upon to perform.7 9
In addition, the Asset Theory stumbles on the requirement that
the "present fair salable value" be used. Unless a default occurs,
there is no market for rights of subrogation and contribution
which are entirely without value. Indeed, the paradox is that the
safer the guaranty is, the more difficult it becomes to justify the
Asset Theory in light of the use of the term "salable" in the
UFCA.
Nevertheless, the argument that the rights of subrogation and
contribution should be given a positive value in calculating insolvency has recently received judicial recognition. In In the Matter
of 0llag ConstructionEquipment Corp.,80 the Second Circuit was
asked to decide whether a subsidiary was insolvent at the time it
secured its parent's note to a bank. The subsidiary had already
guaranteed the note, and the issue was raised whether, in determining solvency under the Bankruptcy Act, the guaranty should
be considered a liability of the subsidiary in the full unpaid
amount of the note without any offsetting asset. Reversing the decisions of the bankruptcy court and the district court, the Second
Circuit held that the actual value of the subsidiary's rights of subrogation against its parent and its rights of contribution against its
coguarantors should have been considered in determining
whether it was solvent.8 1
79. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 256.
80. 578 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1978). See also In re Bowers, 215 F. 617, 618 (N.D. Ga.
1914); Wingert v. President, Directors and Company of Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660, 662
(4th Cir. 1930).
81. Id. at 908.
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In so holding, the court effectively refuted the argument that
the rights of subrogation and contribution are valueless in the
event of default. Creditors do not lose their entire claim in every
insolvency, and well-secured creditors may be paid in full even in
bankruptcy. In Ollag, the court noted that the bank eventually
recovered $139,000 out of a $200,000 total claim by foreclosing on
its security interest in the parent's equipment.82 In short, the Asset
Theory was far from "unrealistic" under the circumstances of 0/lag.
The court was less explicit in treating the argument that the
subsidiary's contingent rights of subrogation and contribution
could not be liquidated at the time the conveyance was made. In
the first place, the court was construing a statutory definition of
insolvency which was somewhat different from the definition in
the UFCA. Instead of referring to "present fair salable value" of
assets, the Bankruptcy Act referred to "a fair valuation" of "the
aggregate of [its] property."8 3 This difference should not preclude
application of the Ollag holding in the context of the UFCA. Although the concept of salability was not expressed in the Bankruptcy Act definition, it is necessarily implied in the concept of "a
fair valuation."8 4 The analysis of the Ollag court is revealed by its
comment that the guaranty liabilities "were tied" to the intangible
assets. 85 Because the liabilities were taken into account, the calculation assumed the fact which made the contingent assets valuable
and probably salable.8 6 In this way, the court seems to have given
effect to a hypothetical present fair salable value. If this approach
is hard to square with the UFCA, it is at least fair.
In addition, the use by the Ollag court of the Asset Theory
should not be construed as a rejection of the Liability Theory. A
reduction in the amount of the subsidiary's liability on the guaranty was not justifiable in light of the dismal financial condition of
the parent in that case.
82. Id
83. 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1976) (repealed 1979).
84. See Grandison v. Nat'l Bank of Comm. of Rochester, 231 F. 800 (2d Cir. 1916); In
re O'Neill Enterprises, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Va. 1973); In re Schindler, 223 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Mo. 1963); In re Quellette, 98 F. Supp. 941 (S.D. Me. 1951); Masonite
Corp. v. Robinson-Slagle Lumber Co., 3 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. La. 1933); In re Sedalia
Farmers' Co-op. Packing & Produce Co., 268 F. 898 (W.D. Mo. 1919); Stem v. Paper, 183
F. 228 (D. N.D. 1910), aft'd, 198 F. 642 (8th Cir. 1910);. In re Hines, 144 F. 142 (D. Or.

1906).
85. 578 F.2d at 908.
86. A creditor's chances in bankruptcy seem to have an attraction for aggressive risktakers. Witness the speculation in securities of bankrupt railroads.
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The application and problems of the Asset Theory can be illustrated by using the examples described earlier. In the Holding
Company Example, if one assumes that the net worth figures reflect fair salable values of assets and probable liabilities, and that
Operating Companies 1, 2, and 3 were advanced $3,000,000 each
from the loan proceeds with the remainder to Operating Company
4, the insolvency test can be applied by analyzing each Operating
Company separately. By assumption, Operating Companies 1, 2,
and 3 would each have an additional $20,000,000 liability and
$3,000,000 in additional assets from the proceeds offset by a corresponding $3,000,000 liability to Parent. Operating Company 4
would have $11,000,000 in additional assets with an equal corresponding liability to Holding Company. Because of the substantial value of Holding Company's interest in the Operating
Companies and the value of the rights of contribution from Operating Companies 1, 2, and 3, each of the Operating Companies
would be justified in valuing its rights of contribution and subrogation at a substantial percentage of the full face value of the
guaranty liability. Operating Company 4 is in slightly worse
shape because it can claim rights of contribution for only 9/20 of
any payment it makes, and its rights of subrogation for the remainder place it lower in priority to creditors of the other Operating Companies. However, even assuming substantial recovery
through subrogation and contribution. The difference between
$20,000,000 face value of the liability and the expected recovery is
probably large enough to give Operating Company 4 a negative
net worth and to cause it to fail the insolvency test. Holding Company can improve the solvency of its subsidiaries by passing on
the loan proceeds as a contribution to capital rather than as a loan
or advance.
In the Acquisition Example, Target Company has no right of
contribution, and its rights of subrogation must be greatly discounted to reflect the absence of Buyer Company's assets other
than Target Company's common stock. Nevertheless, even counting the full face value of the guaranty as a liability, Target Company will continue to have a $200,000 net worth.
In the situation where the borrower (Parent) is strong
financially, the Liability Theory seems much more appealing. The
modification of "liability" by use of the word "probable" in the
UFCA seems to be a clear recognition of the principle that liabilities which will not materialize have no conceivable impact on sol-
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vency.8 7 In the Holding Company Example, assuming that the
business operations of the Operating Companies are stable and
are expected to be profitable enough to pay sufficient dividends to
service the debt, the probable liability is slight in light of the comfortable excess of Holding Company's consolidated net worth over
the principal amount of the obligation. Where the risk of actual
liability is greater, there should still be some discounting of the
liability to reflect its contingent nature. Unfortunately, even attributing a small probable liability in its guaranty is likely to
render operating Company 4 insolvent. In the Acquisition Example, the probability of a claim is larger because Buyer Company
has no reserve to cover its debt service if Target Company falls on
bad times. However, the liability probably should be considerably
discounted to reflect the probability that the wealthy shareholders
of Buyer Company would inject new capital in such circumstances. In this way, the Liability Theory is highly realistic. Any
other rule is not only less realistic but also unfairly complicates
the commercial activities of corporations faced with large but
groundless claims.
The Liability Theory should probably be expanded to effect a
synthesis with the Asset Theory. Both have some merit, and both
seem to produce similar results in the examples considered. In
construing the UFCA definition of insolvency, courts and counsel
should recognize the obvious fact that in drafting such a general
insolvency definition it was not possible to deal expressly with a
situation, such as the guaranty and grant of security interests by
Subsidiary, which involves mutually related contingent assets and
contingent liabilities. Accordingly, the difficulties in applying the
statutory definition create justification for taking the liberty of
construing "probable liability" to mean "probable net liability."
Such a construction permits a realistic appraisal of the financial
strength that Subsidiary needs to adequately cover its responsibility on the guaranty. The existence of such financial strength is all
that creditors can reasonably demand through the UFCA, and upstream guaranties and related grants of security interests should
be enforceable in numerous cases where such strength exists at the
time the guaranty is made or the related security interests granted.
Unfortunately, this happy synthesis does not end the inquiry.
Counsel must somehow obtain an accurate evaluation of the true
value of Subsidiary's assets and the probable exposure on its lia87. See In re Knox Kreations, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 567, 571-72 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
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bilities. There is clearly a need to use estimates which create a
corresponding vulnerability to second-guessing by the creditors'
litigation team and the court to which they present their pleadings.
A careful attorney must leave a margin of error in his or her solvency calculations. This author's experience has shown that
financially strong subsidiaries can obtain sound legal opinions
that their guaranties of their parents' debts are enforceable, while
financially weak subsidiaries (such as our poor Operating Company 4) will have difficulty.
V.

CONCLUSION

From counsel's perspective, the attempt by Parent's lender to
use an upstream guaranty and grant of security interests to circumvent the limitation of liability which would otherwise protect
Subsidiary from responsibility for repayment of Parent's debts
creates numerous problems. Nevertheless, in appropriate circumstances counsel can solve these problems by obtaining a unanimous consent of Subsidiary's shareholders to the transaction, an
amendment to Subsidiary's articles of incorporation giving it the
broadest possible corporate authority, and unconditional crossguaranties of Subsidiary's obligations giving Subsidiary clear
rights of subrogation and contribution against Parent and related
entities. In addition, counsel must take a hard look at Subsidiary's financial condition to ascertain whether such a guaranty and
grant of security interests will be deemed fraudulent conveyances
and, most important, must recognize that an enforceable guaranty
and grant of security interests cannot be given in every case.

